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The Community Property Law
In Washington*
Harry M. Crosst
I. INTRODUCTION
Statutory Pattern
Washington's present community property laws have, in
basic pattern, remained unchanged since the enactment in territorial days of the Code of 1881.' The statutes, in two separate
sections, 2 provide that each spouse owns, separately, all property
owned at the time of marriage, any property thereafter acquired
gratuitously, and the rents, issues and profits of separate property. Property acquired after marriage otherwise than as provided in the two separate property sections is community
3
property.
The husband has management of all community property
and inter vivos power to dispose of the community personal
property 4 but cannot directly convey or encumber community
* Statutory citations, for the most part, are to the Revised Code of
Washington (1953 format) for convenience, even though there are changes
in the code from the phraseology of the session laws. Most of the statutes
material to community property problems are included in Chapter 26.16 of
that code.
In the interests of brevity the writer has usually confined case citations
to the recent or to older illustrative cases rather than tracing the development of any particular principle through the cases. It is believed that this
will fairly demonstrate the current position of the Washington Supreme
Court, and as one of the members of that court explained in suggesting
citations in briefs only to the most recent case, it can be assumed that the
reader has access to the digests and citators. Citations are further limited
to Washington cases for two reasons: (1) this discussion is designed to
present a summary picture of Washington's community property law, only;
and (2) in many instances the Washington Supreme Court has limited its
reported consideration to Washington cases, an approach frequently inevitable currently because a present problem may be the result of earlier
developments peculiar to the Washington cases.
t Professor of Law, University of Washington.
1. The statutory pattern and its development are briefly summarized In
Hill, Early Washington Marital Property Statutes, 14 WASH. L. REV. 118

(1939).
2. WASH. REV. CODE 26.16.010, 26.16.020 (1953).
3. Id. at 26.16.030.
4. Ibid.

[640]
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real property without the wife's joinder in the appropriate
instrument. 5 Each spouse may devise or bequeath his or her half
of the community property," and may deal in all respects with
his or her separate property as if unmarried.7
Man and Woman Unmarried
If property is acquired while a man and woman are living
together, it can be community property only if the acquirer
and the other are husband and wife.8 The interests of the two
if unmarried are necessarily separate property, but the resolution of the problems of ownership between the two can be
affected by the meretricious or innocent character of the relationship.9 In the absence of evidence to the contrary the parties
in a meretricious relationship will be presumed to have intended
ownership to be where title is and no trust will be raised for
the other.' The presumption is not conclusive." If, however, it
is the belief of one or both that they are validly married, the
court will exercise an equity power to protect the innocent party
or parties in determining the ownership, 2 but there is no application of a putative wife doctrine. When both persons participate
in the acquisition (in a business or earning sense, not merely in
a community property, husband and wife sense), the existence
of any meretricious relationship is disregarded and their rights
are resolved under ordinary partnership or joint venture prin3
ciples.'
Time of Marriage
In most situations, of course, the two persons are husband
and wife and inherently there is a preliminary problem of proof
that they were married at the time of acquisition of the assets
involved in the controversy. 4 It is not necessary, however,
that there be direct testimony of the time of marriage. 15
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Poole
Ibid.

26.16.040.
11.04.050.
26.16.010, 26.16.020.
v. Schrichte, 39 Wash.2d 558, 236 P.2d 1044 (1951).

10. Walberg v. Mattson, 38 Wash.2d 808, 232 P.2d 827 (1951); Creasman
v. Boyle, 31 Wash.2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948).
11. Ibid.
12. Poole v. Schrichte, 39 Wash.2d 558, 236 P.2d 1044 (1951).
13. Poole v. Schrichte, 39 Wash.2d 558, 236 P.2d 1044 (1951); Hynes v.
Hynes, 28 Wash.2d 660, 184 P.2d 68 (1947).
14. Chase v. Carney, 199 Wash. 99, 90 P.2d 286 (1939).
15. Proff v. Maley, 14 Wash.2d 287, 128 P.2d 330 (1942).
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DISPOSITION

For problems of management or voluntary disposition of
community real and personal property, the court has evolved
uniform rules. The husband is the statutory agent to manage all
community property and to dispose of community personal
property. Despite the language as to personal property that the
husband has "a like power of disposition as he has of his separate
personal property, except that he shall not devise by will more
than one-half thereof"1' 6 the rule is settled that he must act for
the community interests in a business sense. 17 Consequently the
husband cannot make effective gifts of the community personal
property without the consent of the wife.18 The husband is not
required to be a good manager; so long as he exercises his discretion in the community interest as he sees it, the wife is
without power to frustrate his acts.' 9 While the husband's management power is the same over all community property, he
cannot dispose of community real property unless the wife participates in the transaction.20 Basically the wife has neither a
managing or disposing power over community property of any
kind, 21 but the court has recognized an "emergency power" in
the wife 22 and has recognized that the husband may either directly or through estoppel or ratification make her the agent to
23
conduct community affairs or transactions.
Two problems then arise as to any particular transaction:
(1) whether the subject matter is real or personal property, and
(2) whether the transaction is within the community "business"
24
agency of the actor.
Real or Personal Property
Determination of whether the interest is real or personal
property is made in accordance with historical concepts, and
16. WASH. REV. CODE 26.16.030 (1953).
17. Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Outler, 172 Wash. 540, 20 P.2d 1110 (1933).
18. Marston v. Rue, 92 Wash. 129, 159 Pac 111 (1916).
19. Hanley v. Most, 9 Wash.2d 429, 115 P.2d 933 (1941); Bellingham
Motors Corp. v. Lindberg, 126 Wash. 684, 219 Pac. 19 (1923).
20. The statutory method of participation is joinder in the appropriate
instrument, WASH. REV. CODE 26.16.040 (1953), but the case law recognizes
her "participation" through estoppel or ratification.
21. Feise v. Mueller, 41 Wash.2d 409, 249 P.2d 376 (1952); McAlpine v.
Kohler & Chase, 96 Wash. 146, 164 Pac. 755 (1917).

22. Marston v. Rue, 92 Wash. 129, 159 Pac. 111 (1916).
23. Lucci v. Lucci, 2 Wash.2d 624, 99 P.2d 393 (1940); Short v. Dolling,
178 Wash. 467, 35 P.2d 82 (1934).
24. Much of the discussion of this problem appears In Part V infra.
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the court has held that the statute" requires the wife's joinder
27
26
in execution of term leases, grants of easements and profits,
mortgages of land, 28 as well as conveyances of or contracts to
convey the fee estate.29 On the other hand the leasehold interest
is characterized as personal property and can be assigned or
surrendered by the husband acting alone.3 " The statute is construed, however, to be for the protection of' the wife, and the
third person cannot disaffirm merely because the wife has not
joined. 3 1 He must instead first request execution of the instrument by the wife.8 2 The husband, as manager, apparently can
3
put a person in possession of community land as periodic tenant. 3
If the wife has not joined in the conveyance or encumbrance
the transaction can be nullified against the wishes of the transferree3 4 unless the wife has ratified the husband's acts or has
35
estopped herself to deny their effectiveness.
The classification of the purchaser's interest under a real
estate contract is not clear. Reasoning from the notorious statement in Ashford v. Reese36 that the purchaser in an executory
forfeitable contract has no interest, legal or equitable, in the
land, it can be concluded that whatever the relationship might
be the purchaser's interest at least is not real property, and hence
25. WASH. REV. CODE 26.16.040 (1953).
26. Bowman v. Hardgrove, 200 Wash. 78, 93 P.2d 303 (1939); Kaufman
v. Perkins, 114 Wash. 40, 194 Pac. 802 (1921).

27. Northwestern Lumber Co. v. Bloom, 135 Wash. 195, 237 Pac. 295 (1925).
28. Campbell v. Sandy, 190 Wash. 528, 69 P.2d 808 (1937).
29. Colpe v. Lindblom, 57 Wash. 106, 106 Pac. 634 (1910). But the husband's managing power may extend to modification of the provisions of a
previously executed contract to sell. See In re Horse Heaven Irrigation
District, 19 Wash.2d 89, 95, 141 P.2d 400, 402 (1943).
In Geoghegan v. Dever, 30 Wash.2d 877, 194 P.2d 397 (1948), the court
announced the rather startling proposition that a real estate broker employed by the husband could not secure a judgment for his commission
against community property because the wife had not joined in the commission contract. To hold otherwise, the court felt, would permit the husband alone to encumber the real estate contrary to the provisions of the
statute. McGlauflin v. Merriam, 7 Wash. 111, 34 Pac. 561 (1893) was followed
despite an earlier statement in Philips & Co. v. Bergman, 130 Wash. 346, 227
Pac. 321 (1924) that the McGlaufiin case apparently had been overruled
sub silentio.
30. Gabrielson v. Swinburne, 184 Wash. 242, 51 P.2d 368 (1935); Tibbals v.
Iffland, 10 Wash. 451, 39 Pac. 102 (1895).
31. Stabbert v. Atlas Imperial Diesel Engine Co., 39 Wash.2d 789, 238
P.2d 1212 (1951).
32. Colcord v. Leddy, 4 Wash. 791, 31 Pac. 320 (1892).
33. Cf. Ryan v. Lambert, 49 Wash. 649, 96 Pac. 232 (1908).
34. Benedict v. Hendrickson, 19 Wash.2d 452, 143 P.2d 326 (1943).
35. Campbell v. Webber, 29 Wash.2d 516, 188 P.2d 130 (1947); In re
Horse Heaven Irrigation District, 19 Wash.2d 89, 141 P.2d 400 (1943).
36. 132 Wash. 649, 233 Pac. 29 (1925).
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the husband can deal with it without the wife's joinder.3 The
court has, however, constantly retreated from this sweeping
statement, and common practice is to require the wife's joinder
in any assignment of the purchaser's interest, whether the assignee is a third person or the vendor. The husband may, as
manager, default in payment of installments, thereby putting
the vendor in a position to declare a forefeiture of the purchaser's interest.3 8 In such a situation the husband's act in releasing the purchaser's interest is valid, even though the wife
does not join, under the reasoning that the "release" is not a
conveyance within the spirit of the statute but rather only a
recognition of the fact that the previous interest has been lost.
That the substance rather than the form is important is suggested in two additional situations in which the court has construed transactions as not being conveyances within the meaning
of the statute: (1) an assignment for the benefit of creditors;8 9
40
and (2) a declaration of abandonment of oyster lands.
No mention is made above of a statute enacted in 189141
purporting to empower the record title holder to convey to an
actual bona fide purchaser without joinder of the spouse unless
an inventory asserting a community claim has been filed by the
other spouse. Qualification as an "actual bona fide purchaser" is
so difficult to achieve under the cases 42 that commonly the statute is ignored, and title examiners as a practical matter operate
on the assumption, as an initial proposition, that any owner of a
real property interest is married and that the interest is community property.
Neither spouse has testamentary power over more than his
or her half of the community property. The statute expressly so
37. In

the

recent

case

of Jarrett

v.

Arnerich,

44

Wash.2d

55,

265

P.2d 282 (1954), the husband in concert with the vendor purported to surrender to the vendor in disregard of wife's wishes and rights. The court
affirmed a judgment for plaintiff wife which in effect found there had been
no surrender and said the wife, "as a member of the community, was en-

titled to notice of forfeiture." The basis of the decision appears to be that
the husband exceeded his authority as statutory agent, with the knowledge

of the vendor, and his act therefore was ineffective. The quoted statement
is not necessary to the decision. It is not clear that it is a correct statement
that the wife must participate before there is effective dealing with the
community interest as purchaser under a forfeitable contract.
38. Converse v. LaBarge, 92 Wash. 282, 158 Pac. 958 (1916). But compare
the comment in the preceding note.
39. Thygesen v. Neufelder, 9 Wash. 455, 37 Pac. 672 (1894).
40. Halvorsen v. Pacific County, 22 Wash.2d 532, 156 P.2d 907, 158 A.L.R.

555 (1945).
41. WASH. REV. CODE 26.16.095, 26.16.100, 26.16.110 (1953).
42. Campbell v. Sandy, 190 Wash. 528, 69 P.2d 808 (1937); Dane v. Daniel,
23 Wash. 379, 63 Pac. 268 (1900).
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limits the husband's power over community personal property,43
and the descent statute 44 makes it clear that the limitation extends to all community property.
A statutory provision, 45 unique to Washington, establishes a
form of dispositive instrument commonly called a community
property agreement. By this statute the husband and wife can
enter into an agreement in deed form upon the status and disposition of the whole or any part of the community property,
which agreement takes effect upon the death of either. A common form of this agreement provides for survivorship whereby
all community property is vested in the survivor, and in it also
laymen, who prepare many of them, embody both the present
and prospective change of character of assets mentioned in Part
IV, infra. To distinguish the common three-pronged contract
from the agreement authorized by statute, the latter is here
termed the "statutory community property agreement." The
effect of such an agreement is to eliminate the testamentary
power of each spouse as to his or her half of community property
covered by the agreement. 46 The statutory community property agreement has no other inter vivos effect. 47 The statute does
not limit the parties to survivorship dispositions, nor in any
other fashion (except for preserving the rights of creditors),
and despite the lack of a definitive decision, this writer believes
any conceivable disposition not otherwise proscribed 48 could be
made, even cutting off the survivor entirely or vesting only a
life interest in the survivor with remainders over, etc. There is
s6me support for this belief in In re Dunn's Estate,49 though the
instrument therein met the requirements both of a statutory
community property agreement and of a joint will, and the survivor by joint will reasoning could in effect be limited to a life
interest (though perhaps not technically a life estate as to his
half) in all community property, both his and his deceased wife's
halves.
43. WASH.

REV. CODE 26.16.030 (1953).

44. Id. at 11.04.050.
45. Id. at 26.16.120. See Buckley, The Community Property Agreement
Statute, 25 WASH. L. REv. 165 (1950).
46. In re Brown's Estate, 29 Wash.2d 20, 185 P.2d 125 (1947).
47. Hesseltine v. First Methodist Church, 23 Wash.2d 315, 161 P.2d 157

(1945).
48. E.g., by the rule against perpetuities.
49. 31 Wash.2d 512, 197 P.2d 606 (1948). This view is not shared by the
author of the Washington State Bar Association's pamphlet, "Have You
Made a Will?" which states, "If the parties wish to provide for part of

estate to go to children, it cannot be accomplished by such an agreement."
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Life Insurance Policies
Cases involving management and voluntary disposition of
life insurance policy rights need brief mention.'0 The power of
the insured in inter vivos transactions conforms to the usual
rules applicable to personal property. The husband insured can
surrender the policy for cash payment and pledge it as security. 51 As pointed out in Part III, infra, to the extent that the
policy is purchased with community funds, the policy and its
proceeds are community property. With this as the starting
point the court has developed a partially complete set of rules
governing designation of the beneficiary of the policy. In the
initial case, Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Powers,52 the court struck
down entirely the husband's change of the beneficiary from his
wife to his mother and secretary, reasoning that the designation
of the beneficiary was an attempt to make a gift without consent
of the wife, and therefore ineffective. This extreme position was
distinguished in In re Towey's Estate,5 3 in which the court upheld the payment of proceeds to the husband's executor who
had been substituted for the wife as beneficiary. The husband's
will was exclusively in favor of persons other than his wife, but
the court said the wife's community interest was not affected by
this change since half of the community assets administered by
the executor would belong to the wife as her share. In other
cases an original beneficiary designation of a third person (i.e.,
someone other than the wife of the insured) has been frustrated
at the suit of the wife on the authority of the Powers case, and
in these situations apparently the proceeds become assets of the
community estate, subject to administration.5 4 Under this result
the widow would at least secure half of the proceeds but not
necessarily more. There is no case directly answering the problem of ownership of the proceeds where the change is from the
wife to a third person as beneficiary: is the change of beneficiary
nugatory entirely so that the wife is to be treated as owner as if
50. Discussions of the Washington cases can be found in Recent Cases,
28 WASH. L. REv. 236 (1953), 26 WASH. L. REV. 223 (1951), 20 WASH. L. REV.
167 (1945); Papers Presented at Legal Institute, Life Insurance as Community Property, 16 WASH. L. REV. 187 (1941); Comment, 13 WASH. L. REV.
321 (1938).
51. Page v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 12 Wash.2d 101, 120 P.2d 527 (1942);

Seattle Ass'n of Credit Men v. Bank of California, 177 Wash. 130, 30 P.2d
972 (1934).
52. 192 Wash. 475, 74 P.2d 27, 114 A.L.R. 531 (1937).
53. 22 Wash.2d 212, 155 P.2d 273 (1945).

54. E.g., National

Bank of Commerce v. Lutheran

Wash.2d 790, 246 P.2d 843 (1952); California-Western
v. Jarman, 29 Wash.2d 98, 185 P.2d 494 (1947).

Brotherhood,

40

States Life Ins. Co.
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there had been no attempt to change, or is the change effective
at least to the extent of eliminating the wife as beneficiary, so
that in effect there is no designated beneficiary and the proceeds
are therefore community assets in the estate of the deceased
insured? The latter appears to be the sounder view despite the
apparent singleness of the act of designating a different beneficiary. This position finds some support in the effectiveness of a
change to the insured's executor in In re Towey's Estate, 55 and
also in the approach in Wilson v. Wilson, 56 in which the court,
dealing with a policy owned in shares part separate and part
community determined the designation of the beneficiary in
the policy, that is, the contract, should control to the extent
possible without infringing on the community property policy
of protection of the wife.
While certain results on the basis of these cases can be
predicted with some assurance, the whole area is open to question
by the 4-to-4 split of the court in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Brock57
(with one judge not participating) on the advisability of continuing to follow the Powers case. If the Powers case principle
is in the future rejected, then apparently the husband will be
able to dispose of half of this asset by direct designation of a
third person as beneficiary of his half of the community interest
in the proceeds.
Joint Ownership
The court has not yet answered questions of ownership involving United States savings bonds purchased with community
funds in which a stranger is named beneficiary or co-owner. 58
A somewhat similar problem inheres in the several joint "bank
account" statutes59 which provide that certain contracts with
the financial institution can create survivorship rights. The only
case" involving use of community funds did not reach the survivorship problem because the account was closed prior to the
55.
56.
as to
% as
terest)
57.

22 Wash.2d 212, 155 P.2d 273 (1945).
35 Wash.2d 364, 212 P.2d 1022 (1949). The wife was named beneficiary
% of proceeds but the community interest was %. She took
beneficiary; the other named beneficiary took % (separate inas beneficiary.
41 Wash.2d 369, 249 P.2d 383 (1952).

58. WASH. REV. CODE 11.04.230 (1953)

purports to make the survivor the

sole and absolute owner.
59. It is recognized that these statutes are not limited to bank accounts,
but for simplicity the term is used to include the several principal statutes:
banks, id. at 30.20.015; mutual savings banks, id. at 32.12.030; savings and
loan associations, id. at 33.20.030; credit unions, id. at 31.12.140.
60. Munson v. Eiaye, 29 Wash.2d 733, 189 P.2d 464 (1948).
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death of the wife, who with community funds withdrawn had
opened a new account with a stranger. The court held that the
identification of the source of the account as community funds
necessarily meant that the account was a community asset, in
the absence of a clear showing of an intention to change the
character of ownership into a joint tenancy. It being a community asset the wife had no power to give it away without the
husband's consent.6 1
III. CHARACTER OF OWNERSHIP AS SEPARATE OR

COMiVMnUNITY PROPERTY

"Time of Acquisition" Test
The basic statute provides that any property acquired dur-

ing marriage and not within one of the statutory definitions of
separate property is community property. The location of the
record title in husband or wife or both is not controlling.6 2 The
first step in identifying the original character of any asset, then,
involves determination of the marital status of the acquirer at
the time of the acquisition. If the acquirer was unmarried his or
her ownership then was necessarily separate. (The present character of the ownership may not be the same as its original
character, but this is reserved for later discussion.) 63 The converse, however, cannot be so blandly asserted, that is, one cannot
say that a particular asset acquired during marriage even if not
,a gift is necessarily community property, because the separate
property definition encompasses rents, issues and profits of separate property; and the particular asset first acquired during
marriage may, for instance, have been purchased with funds on

hand at the time of the marriage--which funds necessarily are
61. Whether any arrangement short of the "separate property agreement" discussed in Part IV, infra, could supply the necessary intention to

change the community character of the funds put into a joint account is
not clear. The Munson case, ibid., may, however, eliminate any problem
in reaching a result in favor of the surviving spouse against the stranger

designated a joint depositor by the decedent spouse.
.62. WASH. REV. CODE 26.16.030 (1953). "Under our somewhat perplexing
statutes relating to the acquisition of property, title to real property taken
in the name of one of the spouses may be the separate property of the
spouse taking the title, the separate property of the other spouse, or the
community property of both of the spouses, owing to the source from which

the fund is derived which is used in paying the purchase price of the property. If the fund is derived from the separate property of one of the spouses, the property purchased is the separate property of that spouse; if it
is derived from the community property of both the spouses, it is the community property of both of them." Merritt v. Newkirk, 155 Wash. 517, 520,
285 Pac. 442, 444 (1930).

63. See Part IV, infra.
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separate property assets which remain separate property so long
as they can be traced in their mutations to the particular asset
now at hand. The usual statement is that the character, as separate or community property, of any asset is to be determined as
of the time of its acquisition, 64 but this must be understood to
refer only to original assets whose source of acquisition cannot
be traced (except perhaps to earnings of a spouse). So understood, the "time of acquisition" test will furnish the answer as
to the character of the asset which was acquired by a single,
total consideration paid by the acquirer, but when it is not
clear that the total acquisition occurred at one time, the test has
posed problems for the court. These latter situations include:
(1) conveyance on partial payment with a balance still due
under a purchase-money mortgage either to the vendor or a
third person; (2) conveyance on partial payment and assumption of an existing mortgage for the balance; (3) conveyance on
purchase of the vendor's interest subject to (without assuming)
an existing mortgage; (4) conveyance on full payment to vendor,
part of the funds having been secured by a mortgage on another.
asset (i.e., not a purchase-money mortgage); (5) purchase on an
installment contract with balance due vendor in the future,
conveyance to await payment of all installments.
In the cases involving mortgages a reasonably certain pattern has been established which involves the "source doctrine"
in determining (1) the ownership of the funds used in initial
part payment, and (2) the character of the credit pledged,
i.e., the nature of the obligation underlying the mortgage, which
is presumed to be community obligation 5
The ownership of the funds used to make the partial payment will determine the ownership of that share of the asset,
and the character of the credit pledged to pay the balance will
determine the ownership of the remaining share,"6 without regard to the ownership of the funds ultimately used to discharge
the debt for the balance.6 , Thus if separate credit is primarily
pledged in the borrowing for the balance, the remainder will be
separately owned even though community funds are used to pay
the balance.68 If community credit is pledged, the remainder is
64.
65.
66.
11, 176
67.
68.

In re Witte's Estate, 21 Wash.2d 112, 124, 150 P.2d 595, 601 (1944).
Bryant v. Stetson & Post Mill Co., 13 Wash. 692, 43 Pac. 931 (1896).
These rules were applied in In re Dougherty's Estate, 27 Wash.2d
P.2d 335 (1947).
In re Finn's Estate, 106 Wash. 137, 179 Pac. 103 (1919).
Ibid.
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owned as community property-and this even though the security is by purchase-money mortgage on the property"9 (and apparently even though the property is income-producing and in
fact produces the income to discharge the obligation). The
problems most commonly arise when the wife is the moving
party and makes the initial payment from her separate funds.
If the husband is the moving party, the presumption that an
obligation he incurs is a community obligation" will not, as a
practical matter, ordinarily be overcome even though he has
separate credit and assets, if the transaction does not specifically
show that only his separate credit is pledged. If a mortgage
balance is assumed, the reasoning is the same as if there is a
purchase-money mortgage.
If the wife makes the initial payment from her separate
funds and acquires the balance by borrowing on the security of
a mortgage on other separately owned land, there is authority
that this is a pledge of separate credit even though the husband
also signs the note.71 That the debt is ultimately discharged by
community funds is immaterial. The reasoning in the above
situations apparently is that the time of acquisition is the time
when there is created a binding obligation as to the balance of
the price.
When the title is taken to the property upon the initial payment subject to an outstanding encumbrance, but no promise is
made to pay that encumbrance, the share represented by the
balance apparently is acquired when that encumbrance is discharged and not before, hence the funds used to pay the encumbrance will control the ownership of that share. Thus when
the wife separately made the initial payment and community
funds thereafter were used to discharge the non-assumed encumbrance, the initial share was the wife's separate property
12
and the remainder was community property.
In the above cases the remainder of the total acquisition cost
was due as a lump sum, but there is nothing to indicate a different result when the remainder is due in installments.
On the other hand, when the title is not secured as the immediate result of the transaction, but rather only upon completion of installment payments, as in the typical land-purchase
69. Walker v. Fowler, 155 Wash. 631, 285 Pac. 649 (1930).
70. Bryant v. Stetson & Post Mill Co., 13 Wash. 692, 43 Pac. 931 (1896).
71. In re Finn's Estate, 106 Wash. 137, 179 Pac. 103 '(1919).
72. Ibid.
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contract, the result in terms of ownership remains confused. The
court purports to apply the time of acquisition test, but has
vacillated in its identification of the time of acquisition. The
matter appeared to have been put at rest by the statement in In
re Binge's Estate,7 3 that the ultimate acquisition is but the fruit
of the original obligation and that the time of acquisition was
the time at which the obligation became binding. This proposition is consistent with the solution in the mortgage acquisition
cases, and no regard (in terms of ownership) need be had to
funds used in ultimate discharge of the installments. 74 However,
in In re Dougherty's Estate,7" without indicating why, the court
determined the ownership of personal property to be part separate and part community on the basis of the ownership of the
funds used to discharge the installments. There has been no
recent indication that the ownership relation of the spouses to
property is affected in the slightest by the real or personal property character of the asset.
The result in the Dougherty case, though confusing, is not
surprising in light of the court's treatment of proceeds of life
insurance policies upon the death of the insured. In this latter
type of case a clear pattern of pro rata ownership, part separate
and part community, has been evolved, 76 despite the apparent
inconsistency with earlier results and the statement in the
Binge case concerning land contracts. In the installment purchase cases, and even the mortgage cases, to assert unequivocally
that there is a single time of acquisition challenges credulity,
but at least the time of the original obligation and its character
can be identified.77 There is a distinction which can be drawn
between these two types of acquisitions and the life insurance
proceeds: the installment purchase contract and the mortgage
transactions do involve a fixed obligation that the obligee can
73. 5 Wash.2d 446, 105 P.2d 689 (1940).
74. Previously, in In re Kuhn's Estate, 132 Wash. 678, 233 Pac. 293 (1925),
the court held the surviving widower was owner, separately, when he completed payments on the contract, and that the heirs of the wife only had a
right to be reimbursed for one-half of the amount paid with community
funds prior to the wife's death.
75. 27 Wash.2d 11, 176 P.2d 335 (1947).
76. Wilson v. Wilson, 35 Wash.2d 364, 212 P.2d 1022 (1949); Small v.
Bartyzel, 27 Wash.2d 176, 177 P.2d 391 (1947).
77. Establishing that the credit is other than community credit may
pose difficulties. The husband's signature alone will raise a presumption
of community obligation, the wife's joinder adds nothing to this presumption.
The use made of funds acquired does not appear controlling, but cf. Auernheimer v. Gardner, 177 Wash. 158, 31 P.2d 515 (1934); In re Finn's Estate,
106 Wash. 137, 179 Pac. 103 (1919) (as to the Drew tract); In re Binge's
Estate, 5 Wash.2d 446, 498, 105 P.2d 689, 711 (1940).
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require to be performed (even though alternative remedies
may be available), whereas in the typical life insurance contract
the insurer cannot compel the insured to keep the policy alive
so that there will be proceeds about which to argue. If, therefore, there were one clear rule for the mortgage and contract
cases, and a different rule for ownership of life insurance proceeds it would be understandable and defensible-the difficulty
in this rationalization, however, is that there is not the slightest
suggestion in the cases that this is the explanation for the difference in result; nor is there any other explanation.
Under the present state of case law, while the result in the
mortgage and life insurance proceeds cases is predictable, respectable argument can be advanced in the installment contract
cases that the ownership of the asset is determined (1) at the
time of and by the character of the original obligation (the
mortgage rule); or (2) on a pro rata basis according to ownership of funds used to pay installments (the life insurance rule);
or perhaps (3) only at the time of fulfillment of the contract
and acquisition of title, which apparently will be controlled by
marital status at that time.
Tracing and Commingling
In the area of commingled funds, or assets purchased therewith, the court has perhaps most clearly demonstrated the favor
with which community property is viewed. The rule was well
stated by Judge Steinert as follows:
"Where separate funds have been so commingled with
community funds that it is no longer possible to distinguish
or apportion them, all of the commingled fund, or the -rop78
erty acquired thereby, is community property.
Counterbalancing the commingling doctrine and the presumption that any property acquired by purchase during marriage is community property is the statutory provision that the
rents, issue and profits of separate property are separate property. The particular problem frequently becomes one of tracing,
under the rule that "[s]eparate property continues to be separate property through all of its changes and transitions so long
as it can be clearly traced and identified, and its rents, issues,
and profits likewise are and continue to be separate property. '79
(Italics supplied.)
78. In re Witte's Estate, 21 Wash.2d 112, 125, 150 P.2d 595, 601 (1944).
79. Ibid.
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The statutory provision that rents, issues, and profits of
separate property are also separate property not only simplifies
the problem of ownership of assets secured by exchange or sale
of a separately owned asset, but also underlies problems of tracing the changes in form of separate property, of applying presumptions of community character of spouses' property, and of
commingling separate and community funds. Despite this statutory rule, the beginning point for analysis of the character of
any asset held in the name of a spouse is the presumption of
community ownership. It is clear under the cases that the burden rests on the person asserting the separate ownership to
establish that claim by clear and satisfactory evidence."0
Similarly, to establish the separate ownership of an asset
now in hand as the present form of a previously held asset
admittedly separate property, requires that the changes in form
be clearly traced and identified."' The mere possibility that
separate property has been changed to the present asset is not
enough. In Berol v. Berol, 2 for example, the husband had,
fourteen months after marriage, bought a single premium life
insurance policy in which he designated his mother as beneficiary. This designation is an unauthorized "gift" if the premium
was paid with community funds without the wife's consent and
therefore ineffective.8 3 The court held the requirement of clear
and satisfactory evidence of the separate character of the funds
was not met by the husband's bald statement that he paid the
premium from his separate funds even though he also showed
separate funds were available. In concluding that the value of
the policy should be treated as community property in making
the divorce division, the court stated the separate funds so used
84
should be traced with some degree of particularity.
While mere continuous holding of a particular asset during
marriage will not change its character from separate to community, nor will mere altering its form by exchanges, if the
tracing burden is met, the income-producing asset inherently
creates additional difficulties which are aggravated by the commingling doctrine. Although the court by the decision in In re
Brown's Estate"5 was by local lawyer gossip said to have con80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. 37 Wash.2d 380, 223 P.2d 1055 (1950).
83. See discussion in Part II supra.
84. See also duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Garrison, 13 Wash.2d 170, 124
P.2d 939 (1942).

85. 124 Wash. 273, 214 Pac. 10 (1923).
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cluded that a husband (with a separate estate) did not have to
work for the community but could work exclusively for himself,
it has long since recognized that the talent or capacity of each
spouse is itself a community asset which when exercised produces community property.8 6 Under this view it is theoretically
impossible for a husband to work exclusively for himself in a
separate property sense, and even though his entire toil and
talent is engaged in managing or operating his separately owned
property or enterprise there is at least a partial community
property interest in any return. 8
If the acquisitions by the husband come in part from his own
work and in part from the earnings of his invested separate property, whether there is pro rata ownership of the acquisitions or
only total community ownership depends upon the applicability
of the commingling doctrine. If the husband's business enterprise is in corporate form his ownership will be represented by
shares of stock. Ordinarily increase in the value of the stock (reflecting increase in the corporate value) will be rents, issues and
profits of the separate property, 8 and no serious problem arises
if the husband as operator of the corporate business is paid a
reasonable salary for his toil and talent.8 9 Establishment of this
circumstance depends upon the testimony presented on the reasonableness of the salary and the corporate records revealing
the payment of the salary. 0 The reasonable salary is held to be
the measure of community property acquisition. In such a situation there is contemporaneous segregation of earnings and
increment between the community and separate assets, hence no
commingling problem arises. When the separately owned enterprise is not conducted in corporate form there is a practical
probability of commingling of earnings from the investment and
the husband's ability (separate and community, respectively),91
and if the rule is absolute that commingling makes everything
community property there is not much that can be done. Physical
commingling of separate and community funds should present
86. In re Witte's Estate, 21 Wash.2d 112, 150 P.2d 595 (1944).
87. Of course the community income from the husband's endeavor may
be entirely consumed by regular expenditures so that there is no community interest in a present accumulation. See State ex rel. Van Moss v.
Sailors, 180 Wash. 269, 39 P.2d 397 (1934); Toivonen v. Toivonen, 196 Wash.
636, 84 P.2d 128 (1938).
88. In re Hebert's Estate, 169 Wash. 402, 14 P.2d 6 (1932).
89. Ibid. See also Hamlin v. Merlino, 44 Wash.2d 851, 272 P.2d 125 (1954).
90. Ibid.
91. Consider the situations in In re Witte's Estate, 21 Wash.2d 112, 150
P.2d 595 (1944); Salisbury v. Meeker, 152 Wash. 146, 277 Pac. 376 (1929).
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92
no problem other than a "fungible goods" confusion problem,
at least in situations where records contemporaneously kept
clearly indicate the respective acquisitions to be credited to separate property and community endeavor. If contemporaneous
records are not available, the problem would appear to be one
of "tracing" to the sources of the present accumulation.

At this point a policy problem arises: Should a commingled
fund be conclusively presumed to be community property in the
absence of a clear showing of an affirmative intent of the spouses
to the contrary, which intent can be demonstrated only by establishing contemporaneous segregation? This appears to be the
proposition advanced in a dictum recently, 93 and the result may
be satisfactory in controversies between the spouses or a spouse
and gratuitous successors of the other (heirs, devisees, donees),
though at least one other recent case 94 does not conform. As
suggested elsewhere in many situations such a result would
accord with the unexpressed intent of the spouses to throw all
assets into the common pot for the benefit of the marriage. But
a conclusive presumption in the absence of contemporaneous
segregation could pose serious problems for third parties to
whom a spouse was separately obligated, to say nothing of the
problems under tax liabilities.9 6 The commingling doctrine is,
in this writer's opinion, simply a form of the presumption of the
community character of an asset on hand during the marriage,
and the common conclusion that the commingled funds are
community property results merely from the failure to carry
the burden to establish by clear and satisfactory evidence the
asserted separate character, in whole or part, of the funds or
asset acquired thereby. "Tracing" in this framework is merely
the process of carrying that burden of proof; and while the
92. The applicable rules are discussed in BROWN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF

PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 30-36 (1936).

93. Hamlin v. Merlino, 44 Wash.2d 851, 858, 272 P.2d 125, 129 (1954).
94. Holm v. Holm, 27 Wash.2d 456, 178 P.2d 725 (1947). In a divorce the
trial court concluded all community property should be divided equally and
that the whole of the business property was community property by commingling. The Supreme Court modified the decree to preserve for the husband as his separate property the amount invested in the business at the
time of marriage. Even though clearly there was commingling of the investment with later earnings, proof of the original amount was permitted.
On the other hand no attempt was made by the court to apportion the later
increment, but this may be of no particular significance since the court can

award any property of the spouses as circumstances require.
95. Kizer, Community Interest in Commingled Income, Derived from
Personal Service and Separate Capital---Another View, 23 WASH. L. REv. 8

(1948).
96. LeSourd, Community Property Status of Income from Business Involving Personal Services and Separate Capital, 22 WASH. L. Rzv. 19 (1947).
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absence of a contemporaneous segregation may make the burden
beyond carrying, it should not conclusively preclude the attempt.
But it is conceded that the cases do not now answer the question
of the significance of the absence of contemporaneous segregation.
Separate Property and "Community Relationship"
In addition to property owned by one spouse at marriage
together with the rents, issues and profits thereof, the general
statutes 97 provide that separate property also includes that acquired by gift, devise or inheritance. There is no doubt that
the facts of a particular acquisitive transaction rather than the
form of the transaction will govern the character of the ownership 9 8-the court's position is clear that the statute speaks of
donative acquisition. 99 Another statute'00 provides that the earnings of the wife and minor children living with her while living
separate from her husband shall be her separate property. Beyond this point the statutes are silent, but the cases develop an
additional requirement that there be a community relationship,
not merely a marriage relationship, between the spouses in
order that an asset be characterized as community property.
In addition to the statutory position of the wife as separate
owner of her earnings while living apart from the husband, the
court in Wampler v. Beinert some years ago held that the husband lost his power as manager of the community property when
he deserted the wife.10 1 Subsequently in the case of Togliatti v.
Robertson10 2 the court concluded that the husband's acquisition
long after he and his wife had permanently separated was his
separate property. It is not, from the Togliatti case, entirely
clear whether the basis for the court's conclusion was a "separate
property agreement" inferred from the long separation (discussed in Part IV, infra) or the lack of a community relationship
between the spouses. In the most recent case, In re Armstrong's
Estate,0 3 separation followed entry of an interlocutory decree
97. WASH. REV. CODE 26.16.010, 26.16.020 (1953).

98. Andrews v. Andrews, '116 Wash. 513, 199 Pac. 981 (1921); Mechem,
Progress of the Law in Washington: Community Property, 8 WASH. L. REv.
1, 4-7 (1933).
99. Even though the asset is acquired by gift it can be community property, apparently, if the gift is to both of them with that intent (rather than
as tenants in common). See Schilling v. Schilling, 42 Wash.2d 105, 107,
253 P.2d 952, 953 (1953). The power to control the character of property
owned, discussed in Part IV, supra, also suggests this possibility.
100. WASH. REV. CODE 26.16.140 (1953).

101. 125 Wash. 494, 216 Pac. 855 (1923).
102. 29 Wash.2d 844, 190 P.2d 575 (1948).
103. 33 Wash.2d 118, 204 P.2d 500 (1949).

1955]

WASHINGTON COMMUNITY PROPERTY

657

of divorce and shortly thereafter the particular asset was acquired by the husband. The court concluded the asset was his
separately on the basis of the Togliatti case, stating that the
wife had made no contribution to the acquisition. This. suggests,
at least, that the Togliatti reasoning of the lack of a community
relationship is controlling. There is some further support for
this conclusion in the Wampler case wherein the husband was
supplanted from his community agent's position by his desertion
of the wife, and in Yates v. Dohring,0 4 involving the family
expense statute, 10 5 where the court concluded the wife had not
incurred a "family" expense when she had permanently separated from the husband and had refused to perform her ordinary marital duties. From this might be drawn the conclusion
that only the "innocent" spouse can subsequently acquire separate property and that the "guilty" spouse's acquisitions would
be community property, but in fact in the Yates and the Togliatti
cases the separation was mutually desired and probably there
was no "guilty" spouse. It is this writer's belief, therefore, that
whenever there can be shown a permanent separation of the
spouses, the subsequent acquisitions of either will be separate
property even though there is no dissolution of the marriage.
Proving that there has been a permanent separation may be
troublesome, and can most easily be done by an action for divorce
or separate maintenance, but even in the absence of such litigation there would appear to be no reason to deny possible
adequacy of other proof. This would permit a separate acquisition by the "innocent" spouse who might be either, or both, if
the separation was by mutual consent, and still permit the court
to characterize the husband's subsequent acquisition as community property if he deserted the wife.10 6
IV.

TRANSACTIONS AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN SPOUSES

Separate and Community Property Agreements
The statute'0 7 authorizes conveyance of the grantor's community interest by either spouse to the other, 08 with the result
104. 24 Wash.2d 877, 168 P.2d 404 (1946).
105. WASH. REv. CoDR 26.20.010 (1953).
106. Id. at 26.16.140, for the wife living separate from her husband, apparently would make the deserting wife's subsequent acquisition separate
regardless of her "guilt."
107. Id. at 26.16.050.

108. Payment with community funds will result in community ownership even though the title is taken in the wife's name, only, at the direction
of the husband. An oral gift of real estate is

ineffective.

In

re Parker's

Estate, 115 Wash. 57, 196 Pac. 632 (1921). However, the court has held under
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that the subject matter of the conveyance becomes the separate
property of the grantee. 0 9 And of course the power of either
spouse as to separate property is as complete as if he or she
were unmarried,"" so that conveyance by one to the other would
be treated similarly to conveyances between strangers. The effect of the first mentioned statute is to empower spouses to
change community property into separate property, and the
court in Volz v. Zang"" stated that if such a change was permissible, the reverse was also permissible (which is a non
sequitur). In addition to this explanation the court in the Volz
case reasoned that the favor with which community property is
viewed and the fact that there is no express prohibition against
the result, permitted the conclusion that separate property
could be changed into community property by a document in
deed form which clearly expressed the intention of the spouses
to do so.1 1 2 But even beyond this point the court has given effect
to agreements between the spouses that any property acquired
after the effective date of the agreement should be community
property, and this, if the intention is established, without regard
to the manner of acquisition of the particular asset. 1 3
The rather general freedom accorded the spouses in dealings
between themselves has resulted in recognition of what can be
called "separate property agreements" by which not only presently held property becomes the separate property of the respective spouses,1 1 4 but also any subsequently acquired property
somewhat comparable facts that the conveyance by the grantor, at the husband's direction, to the wife "as her sole and separate property" will make
the property hers separately. Goodfellow v. LeMay, 15 Wash. 684, 47 Pac.

25 (1896).
109. WAsH. REV. CODE 26.16.210 (1953) in transactions between the spouse
puts the burden of proof on the person asserting the good faith of the
transaction.
110. Id. at 26.16.010, 26.16.020. See Scott v. Currie, 7 Wash.2d 301, 109
P.2d 526 (1941), in which the court applied a presumption of gift to the conveyance of land by the grantor to the wife at the direction of the husband
who paid therefor with his separate funds.
111. 113 Wash. 378, 194 Pac. 409 (1920).
112. The mere conveyance by one spouse of a half interest in the

grantor's separate property does not give the grantee a half interest as a
community share, but rather makes the grantor and grantee tenants in
common. Powers v. Munson, 74 Wash. 234, 133 Pac. 453 (1913).

113. These agreements are frequently called community property agreements but are not the statutory community property agreements referred
to in Part II supra.
114. Burch v. Rice, 37 Wash.2d 185, 222 P.2d 847 (1950); In re Garrity's
Estate, 22 Wash.2d 391, 156 P.2d 217 (1945); In re Martin's Estate, 127 Wash.

44, 219 Pac. 838 (1923). Aside from statute of frauds problem as to real
property, oral agreements may be sufficient. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Brock,
41 Wash.2d 369, 249 P.2d 383 (1952).
184 P.2d 564 (1947).

Cf. Leroux v. Knoll, 28 Wash.2d 964,
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is separate property of one or the other, thereby preventing any
acquisition of assets as community property. This appears to be
the proposition although an early case"1 5 suggested that the
agreement amounted to a continuing offer to make a gift whereby
community property upon its acquisition immediately was
changed into separate property. As discussed in Part V, infra,
the effect as to third parties can differ substantially under one
interpretation of the effect of the separate property agreement
rather than the other.
The court, as pointed out in Part III, supra, has developed a
recognition of a marriage relationship distinct from both a family relationship and a community relationship. In this framework it can be said that the court has also recognized that there
might be both a family and a marriage relationship without there
being a community relationship. While it is true that many
separate property agreements are a part of separation agreements made in connection with divorce or separation of the
spouses, there are also those between spouses intending to continue normal marriage and family relationships. The court, in
the divorce and other cases, upholds the finality of separate
property agreements as between the spouses,"" if that is their
intention, while at the same time reaffirming the power of the
court in divorce and separate maintenance actions to adjust the
property relationships of the parties without being bound by the
character of particular assets before the court. In other words,
although a factor to be considered is the character of the asset
as separate or community property, the court in such actions
may not only unequally divide the community property between
the two but also award separate property of one to the other.1 7
Written separate property agreements between spouses are not
uncommon when they are separated or contemplate separation
or divorce, but it is probable that oral agreements in other
situations will be given effect if proved. Here the burden of
clear and satisfactory evidence is required and may not be met.",
Improvements
Besides these purposeful arrangements between the spouses,
there is an additional area of transactions between them involv115. Yake v. Pugh, 13 Wash. 78, 42 Pac. 528, 52 Am. St. Rep. 17 (1895).
116. See cases cited note 114 supra.
117. Patrick v. Patrick, 43 Wash.2d 139, 260 P.2d 878 (1953), or almost
any divorce case involving property division.
118. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Brock, 41 Wash.2d 369, 249 P.2d 383 (1952);
State v. Miller, 32 Wash.2d 149, 201 P.2d 136 (1948); Piles v. Bovee, 168 Wash.
538, 12 P.2d 914 (1932).
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ing improvement of land held in one character by the use of
funds held in another character. Theoretically the asset improved can be held as separate property of the wife or of the
husband or as community property, and the improvement made
with funds held in either of the other two characters. This factual situation presents the problem of creation of an equitable
lien in favor of the improver for reimbursement. The rule is
clear that such investment does not create an ownership in the
asset in favor of the improver, 119 and further, it does not necessarily follow that there will be a lien for reimbursement.'" A
common problem of this sort turns around an assertion of community lien for improvement of the husband's separate property.
In some situations the basic fact of improvement with community funds cannot be established,' 2' for the court has concluded
that if there are separate funds as well as community funds
adequate to pay for the improvements, it will be presumed that
the "proper" fund is the source of the improvement; hence separate funds made the improvement and the community has no
lien. 122 Of course if there is no showing of the existence of
separate funds, the basic pattern for the lien is established. As a
practical matter it may well be more difficult to establish a lien
in favor of the husband or the community interests when the
improvement is made at the husband's direction on the wife's
separate property, because of an assumption (or perhaps illdefined presumption) that the husband intends to make a gift
of the improvement. 23 It is not impossible to show the absence
of such an intention, however.

24

119. Leroux v. Knoll, 28 Wash.2d 964, 184 P.2d 564 (1947); Legg v. Legg,
34 Wash. 132, 75 Pac. 130 (1904).
120. In re Hart's Estate, 149 Wash. 600, 271 Pac. 886 (1928). It may be

that the improver, or advancer of funds, has received full value for the
advance, hence has no right to reimbursement. See Merkel v. Merkel, 39
Wash.2d 102, 234 P.2d 857 (1951), where in divorce award the court considered

mortgage interest, tax and upkeep payments as no more than reasonable
rental for use of land.
121. Pekola v. Strand, 25 Wash.2d 98, 168 P.2d 407 (1946). In Legg v.
Legg, 34 Wash. 132, 75 Pac. 130 (1904), the lien was allowed for "labor" as
well as "money" improvements. The Pekola case indicates the amount of
contribution must be shown, but there is doubt of the correctness of the
statement therein that the lien is allowed only for funds advanced.
122. In re Woodburn's Estate, 190 Wash. 141, 66 P.2d 1138 (1937).
123. In re Hickman's Estate, 41 Wash.2d 519, 250 P.2d 524 (1952).
124. Ibid. In a 5 to 4 decision the court held the equitable lien of the
community could be reached by the trustee in bankruptcy as an asset of
the bankrupt community's estate. Conley v. Moe, 7 Wash.2d 355, 110 P.2d
172, 133 A.L.R. 1089 (1941). If the spouses could show gift or relinquishment
of any potential lien and meet the burden of proving good faith required by
WASH. REv. CODE 26.16.210 (1953), the result in this case might be avoided,
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INVOLUNTARY DISPOSITION

While many of the problems of this part could be discussed
under the management of the community's affairs, controversy
does not ordinarily arise unless there is disagreement on the
extent of enforceability of the claim; thus these problems commonly are ones of involuntary disposition of community property. The genesis of many of the problems was the court's
interpretation that the statute insulates community property
from all obligations separate in character, whether ante- or postnuptial.125 Originally it was the position of the court that a distinction should be drawn between the availability of real property, on one hand, and personal property on the other, but the
rule has now long been settled to the contrary. 126 In addition to
the unavailability of the whole of the community property, the
court has held that a separate obligation cannot be enforced
even against the debtor's half interest in community property, 12
but only against his or her separate property (if any). These
propositions compel classification of obligations as separate or
community.
Non-tort Obligations
In the ordinary course of affairs, any non-tortious act by a
husband will presumptively be done as statutory manager and
will create a community obligation.'2- If his act is done in managing a community asset or conducting a community business,
community liability will follow as well as a separate liability
against him. Extraordinary acts will create community liability
if the husband's purpose was to benefit the community. 129 The
actual accrual of benefit is unnecessary,8 0 the lack of good
but otherwise a creditor may be in a stronger position to assert the lien
than the improver.
On the other hand the court has given effect to the separate equitable
lien over the claim of a community creditor to proceeds from the sale of a
contract purchaser's interest. Farrow v. Ostrom, 16 Wash.2d 547, 133 P.2d
974 (1943).

125. WASH. REV. CODE 26.16.200 (1953) protects separate property from
separate debt of other spouse; post-nuptial separate debt: Katz v. Judd, 108
Wash. 557, 185 Pac. 613 (1919).
126. Schramm v. Steele, 97 Wash. 309, 166 Pac. 634 (1917).
127. Stockand v. Bartlett, 4 Wash. 730, 31 Pac. 24 (1892).
128. Fisher v. Hagstrom, 35 Wash.2d 632, 214 P.2d 654 (1950); Fies v.
Storey, 37 Wash.2d 105, 221 P.2d 1031 (1950); Whitehead v. Satran, 37
Wash.2d 724, 225 P.2d 888 (1950).

129. Beyers v. Moore, 145 Wash. Dec. 62, 272 P.2d 626 (1954).
130. Ibid.
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judgment is immaterial,' 31 and the dissent of the wife is irrele13 2
vant.
Suretyship obligations executed by the husband furnish the
common problem. Unless there was the intent to benefit the
community, directly or indirectly, the argument will be that
there has been an attempt to make a gift of the community
credit 133 which is no more effective, without the wife's consent,
than is a similar donative transfer of title to community property. 134 It was once held that the wife would be presumed to
consent to the pledge of community credit to assist a child of
the husband and wife," 35 but this case was directly overruled
on the basis that the husband's agency was for conduct of the
business of the community,"36 with the result that benefit to the
community property or furtherance of a community purpose
must be intended before liability will extend beyond separate
responsibility of the husband. This rule is not as restrictive as
might appear at first blush because (1) the burden of proof is
on the one asserting the separate character of the transaction," 31
and (2) the intended benefit may be indirect as well as direct.
The community purpose has been found, for example, in going
surety for a corporation in which there are community funds
invested," 38 in reviving an obligation by payment on a note
barred by time,1 9 in participating in financing the development
of a golf club' 4 -- in other words, apparently community liability
will exist if a community asset is somehow (no matter if only
remotely) connected with the particular transaction, or if personal activity of a spouse is furthered.
In many transactions funds or other assets are immediately
acquired by entering into the obligation. It is not entirely clear
whether the use made of the funds is significant in determining
the character of the obligation. In support of the conclusion of
community liability the court has recently pointed out that the
131. Hanley v. Most, 9 Wash.2d 429, 115 P.2d 933 (1941); Bellingham
Motors Corp. v. Lindberg, 126 Wash. 684, 219 Pac. 19 (1923).
132. Note 131 supra.
133. Zarbell v. Mantas, 32 Wash.2d 920, 204 P.2d 203 (1949).
134. See discussion in Part II supra.
135. Stevens v. Naches State Bank, 136 Wash. 137, 238 Pac. 918 (1925).
136. Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Outler, 172 Wash. 540, 20 P.2d 1110 (1933).
137. Beyers v. Moore, 145 Wash. Dec. 62, 272 P.2d 626 (1954).
138. Horton v. Donohoe-Kelly Banking Co., 15 Wash. 399, 46 Pac. 409
(1896).
139. Catlin v. Mills, 140 Wash. 1, 247 Pac. 1013 (1926).
140. Olympia Building & Loan Ass'n v. McCroskey, 172 Wash. 148, 19
P.2d 671 (1933).

1955]

WASHINGTON COMMUNITY PROPERTY

663

14 1
which may be
funds were used for community purposes,
merely indicating that the burden of proving a separate obliga142
in which the wife's
tion has not been carried, but in a case
separate property was mortgaged to secure the advance, the
court clearly held that the use of the funds for non-community
purposes, pursuant to the pre-existing intention of the spouses,
Was irrelevant-the funds when first received, said the court,
were acquired by the husband's pledge of community credit and
were available for any community purpose.

The unavailability of community property to separate creditors poses a practical problem to those extending credit to unmarried persons. The truth apparently is that this insulation
is not asserted by most recently married persons, but credit
managers are confronted with what is loosely called "marital
bankruptcy" in a wide variety of situations. The supplier of
goods may be able to reach the goods which retain their separate
property character, but the supplier of services does not even
have this small consolation-how (or why) would the dentist,
for example, recapture the product of his labors?
Conflicting policies of the community property system and
divorce-alimony rules have collided head-on under this principle.
The court has only partly met the problem of continuing protection to the divorced wife and children-obviously a separate
obligation of the husband since it arises prior to his later marriage. In one case 43 the court held real property owned as
community property of the husband and his second wife cannot
be reached to satisfy the divorce decree awards, even though it
had previously held that garnishment of the husband's salary
was permissible.144 This may be a limited throw-back to an
abandoned distinction 45 between the real and personal property
rights and powers of the husband, but perhaps the dissenting
judge had a better idea when he suggested that the second wife
just took an "encumbered" husband.
Whether the husband or wife is the moving party there will
probably always be separate liability, but no presumption of
community liability arises from the wife's obligations. In two
types of situations community liability may result from the
141. Fies v. Storey, 37 Wash.2d 105, 221 P.2d 1031 (1950).

Binge's Estate, 5 Wash.2d 446, 485, 105 P.2d 689, 706 (1940).

See also In

142. Auernheimer v. Gardner, 177 Wash. 158, 31 P.2d 515 (1934).
143. Stafford v. Stafford, 10 Wash.2d 649, 117 P.2d 753 (1941).

144. Fisch v. Marler, 1 Wash.2d 698, 97 P.2d 147 (1939).
145. Schramm v. Steele, 97 Wash. 309, 166 Pac. 634 (1917).
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wife's obligations: (1) transactions falling within the "family
expense" statute'40 which create three-way liability (separatehusband, separate-wife, and community), and (2) transactions
by the wife for a community purpose which the husband either
has authorized or ratified, or the community character of which
he has estopped himself to deny. 147 To avoid community liability after he acquires sufficient knowledge of the transaction,
the husband must act promptly, but this prerequisite provides
substantial protection against community liability from many
148
acts of the wife.
Clearly the husband may formally appoint the wife agent
to conduct community affairs, 49 but in addition the wife's agency
may be established by a course of conduct so that her acts may
create community liability. A peculiar offshoot, of undefined
scope, appeared in Lucci v. Lucci' 50 in which the wife's agency
was found and a separate liability was imposed on the husband
as well as the community liability. The wife's conduct of a
grocery clearly benefitted the two of them in a community property sense and comparable liability for a loan used in ordinary
community transactions follows, but there would appear to be
nothing in the borrowing which benefited the husband in a
separate property sense. The usual approach of the court in
resolving problems of liability can be epitomized in referring
to the husband-wife community as an "entity."' 151 Conceivably
the unexpressed reasoning of the court is that all community
contractual transactions necessarily and unavoidably involve
the husband's action as managing "principal" with the result
that "entity" reasoning is inappropriate. There is nothing, however, to delineate the significance of the case.
146. WASH. REV. CODE 26.20.010 (1953).
147. Conner v. Zanuszoski, 36 Wash.2d 458, 218 P.2d 879 (1950); Williams
v. Beebe, 79 Wash. 133, 139 Pac. 867 (1914). See also Feise v. Mueller, 41
Wash.2d 409, 249 P.2d 376 (1952).
148. Jones, Rosquist, Killen Co. v. Nelson, 98 Wash. 539, 167 Pac. 1130

(1917).

149. WASH. REV. CODE 26.16.060 (1953).

150. Lucci v. Lucci, 2 Wash.2d 624, 99 P.2d 393 (1940).
151. Though of course the court does not uniformly reach results on the
basis that this "entity" is the principal in the agency law sense. See Mechem,
Progress of the Law in Washington: Community Property, 7 WASH. L. REV.
367-70 (1933). The clearest rejection of the "entity" reasoning was made in
Bortle v. Osborne, 155 Wash. 585, 285 Pac. 425, 67 A.L.R. 1152 (1930), in
which the court held a tort cause of action did not survive against the
community after the death of the tortfeasor spouse. This particular result
has been changed by a 1953 statute, WASH. REV. CODE 4.20.045 (1953), discussed

in Richards, Washington Legislation-1958, Torts, 28 WASH. L. REv. 201-4
(1953).
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Tort Obligations
In tort cases1 52 while there is no presumption to aid the
plaintiff, community liability may be found by either of two
routes: 153 (1) when the act is one within the managing power of
the actor for the community on a basis of respondeat superior,
and (2) when the act is done for the benefit of the community.
The latter test clearly applies when assets acquired by the
tort (e.g., conversion) are community property under the statutory definitions.1 5 4 The former might be called "management"
torts, and from recent decisions it is open to argument that,
except for the "official capacity" torts, this category will include
all tortious conduct, or at least all not within the "benefit" category. A willful, fatal beating gave rise to community liability
in McHenry v. Short,155 in which the husband was either ejecting a trespasser from community land or was performing duties
as watchman on the land. Community liability was found in
LaFramboise v. Schmidt' 56 when the husband took indecent
liberties with the small girl being cared for by him and his wife.
Recreational activities, 157 even though somewhat abnormal, l 58
have been held to be community activities resulting in community liability. And of course, torts committed in connection
with the actor's business affairs either as entrepreneur or employee create community liability. 59 There may yet be, however,
an area in which the tortious conduct so clearly has no relationship to community affairs that only separate liability can be
imposed. Here would fall the liability in an action against a
husband for alienation of the affections of plaintiff's wife, and
perhaps the purely personal altercation. 60
Official Capacity Tort
A peculiar rule exists covering the tort liability of a public
official. Despite the fact that the salary earned is community
152. The cases are more extensively analyzed in Pruzan, Community
Property and Tort Liability in Washington, 23 WASH. L. REv. 259 (1948).

153. Bergman v. State, 187 Wash. 622, 60 P.2d 699, 106 A.L.R. 1007 (1936).
154. McGregor v. Johnson, 58 Wash. 78, 107 Pac. 1049, 27 L.R.A.(N.s.)
1022 (1910).
155. 29 Wash.2d 263, 186 P.2d 900 (1947).
156. 42 Wash.2d 198, 254 P.2d 485 (1953).
157. King v. Williams, 188 Wash. 350, 62 P.2d 710 (1936).
158. Moffitt v. Krueger, 11 Wash.2d 658, 120 P.2d 512 (1941).
159. Local No. 2618 v. Taylor, 197 Wash. 515, 85 P.2d 1116 (1938); Mine v.
Kane, 64 Wash. 254, 116 Pac. 659, 36 L.R.A.(N.s.)

88 (1911).

160. Newbury v. Remington, 184 Wash. 665, 52 P.2d 312 (1935). Though
perhaps the wife rather than the plaintiff should carry the cost burden of
her husband's pugnaciousness.
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property' and hence it would seem that the spouse's acts as an
official are "community" acts, the court has held that only a
separate liability arises from torts committed in the officer's
official capacity. 161 It was once contended that if the tort of the
husband in negligently driving a taxicab in his business caused
community liability, the same should be true of the tort of a
husband whose whole endeavor was devoted to duties as a public
official. The purported explanation by the court was, "The distinction is as clear as any distinction can be. The community
drives the automobile; the community does not make the levy.
The one is a community tort; the other is an official or separate
162
tort.'
Effect of Separate Property Agreement
The effectiveness of a separate property agreement mentioned in Part IV, supra, is not limited to the ownership rights
of the spouses, but in addition, the court has recognized that
property, which would otherwise be community property and
available to a creditor, will pursuant to such an agreement be
separate property and thus, in the hands of the non-acting spouse,
beyond the reach of the creditor.163 This can be phrased either
that the contractual liability is only separate, or that the liability
though community and separate does not reach this asset as
separate property of the non-acting spouse. Such an agreement
is effective against subsequent creditors even though they do
not know of the agreement,10 4 but not against existing creditors. 16 5 The existence of the agreement must be satisfactorily
proved.'6 6 The writer has found no cases considering the effect
of an existing separate property agreement on the position of
the tort judgment creditor.
Out-of-State Creditors
In view of the excellent discussion of the problems elsewhere, 67 mention only need be made of the court's treatment
of out-of-state creditors seeking to reach Washington assets. The
court has reasoned that a claim arising in non-community property state is necessarily a separate claim, hence enforceable in
Washington only against separate property of the actor. The
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Brotton v. Langert, 1 Wash. 73, 23 Pac. 688 (1890).
Day v. Henry, 81 Wash. 61, 64, 142 Pac. 439, 440 (1914).
Union Securities Co. v. Smith, 93 Wash. 115, 160 Pac. 304 (1916).
Piles v. Bovee, 168 Wash. 538, 12 P.2d 914 (1932).
Davison v. Hewitt, 6 Wash.2d 131, 106 P.2d 733 (1940); Marsh v.

Fisher, 69 Wash. 570, 125 Pac. 951 (1912).
166. State v. Miller, 32 Wash.2d 149, 201 P.2d 136 (1948).
167. MARSH,

MARITAL PROPERTY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 148-54 (1952).
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position has been taken when after incurring the obligation the
debtor and spouse moved to Washington, 168 and also when a
Washington domiciliary has incurred an obligation outside of
the state, either tort1 69 or contract.1 70 This "bankruptcy" by
moving to Washington is unwarranted enough, but this distinctive treatment of the out-of-state creditors of the Washington
domiciliary not only is unfair but should boomerang on Washington residents in all dealings with out-of-state businesses.
With the knowledge and consent of the wife (to preclude
the argument of unauthorized gift), the separate debt, whether
out-of-state or otherwise, presumably could be changed into a
community debt if a clear expression of the purpose to do so is
shown,"" but unfortunately such a factual pattern is not common and the presumption usually controlling is that a debt,
just as an asset, retains its character even though it may change
172
its form.
VI. CONCLUSION

On the whole the community property law is apparently
working to the satisfaction of Washington residents. There is no
general sentiment expressed in favor of abandoning it even
though particular complications are spasmodically deplored. Most
persons who might be caught on technicalities which make transactions hazardous or cumbersome know (even if they do not
understand) the "ground rules" which meet the problems, and
immigrants from non-community property states quit "shaking
their heads" as the "natives" reveal the ground rules.
Statutory codification of the rules developed by the court
plus correction of some of the deficiencies would be desirable,
but there is no group with a specialized interest in the problem.
Piecemeal changes such as elimination of the "marital bankruptcy" rule have been informally proposed by certain legislators, but until there is established some form of law revision
commission 7 3 it appears probable no comprehensive corrective
legislation will be proposed.
168. Meng v. Security State Bank of Woodland, 1.6 Wash.2d 215, 133 P.2d
293 (1943); LaSelle v. Woolery, 14 Wash. 70, 44 Pac. 115, 53 Am. St. Rep. 855
(1896).
169. Mountain v. Price, 20 Wash.2d 129, 146 P.2d 327 (1944).
170. Achilles v. Hoopes, 40 Wash.2d 664, 245 P.2d 1005 (1952).
171. This was argued in Meng v. Security State Bank of Woodland, 16
Wash.2d 215, 133 P.2d 293 (1943).
172. Katz v. Judd, 108 Wash. 557, 185 Pac. 613 (1919).
173. See Cross, Law Revision in the State of Washington, The Present
Picture and a Proposal, 27 WASH. L. Rsv. 193 (1952).

